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How It Works cover — a policy tree decides every tool call before it runs. Read this before deploying. Everything else in these docs assumes the model on this page.

The problem

An AI coding agent is an ordinary process running as the developer. It inherits everything they can reach: the whole home directory, every credential file, every internal service, the shell. It acts continuously, at speed, on instructions that may have come from a web page, a dependency, or a file it was asked to read. Traditional endpoint tooling does not help much here, because nothing the agent does is unusual on its own. Reading a file is normal. Running curl is normal. The question is whether this agent should be doing it.

The model

AgenShield answers that question in three parts.

Detect

Every AI agent on the Mac is found automatically and governed as its own actor — separate from you and from your other applications.

Decide

Every program an agent runs, file it opens, and destination it reaches is evaluated against the policy your organization defines centrally.

Record

Every decision — allowed, blocked, or merely observed — is recorded, with credentials removed before anything leaves the Mac.
There is no per-agent switch to flip. From the moment AgenShield is installed and your organization’s policy arrives, every agent it detects is governed by that policy automatically.

The agents AgenShield knows about

AgenShield recognizes a broad, growing catalog of AI agents — Claude Code, Cursor, Codex CLI, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot, Windsurf, Aider, Claude Desktop, and more. The catalog is delivered alongside policy, so new agents become known to the fleet without reinstalling anything. agenshield status shows what was found on this Mac:
Developers keep launching their agents the same way — nothing about their workflow changes.

The execution tree

Agents rarely act directly. They run a build tool, which runs a package manager, which opens a network connection. AgenShield follows that chain — the execution tree — so an action taken three processes deep is still attributed to the agent that started it, and evaluated against that agent’s policy. The tree is what makes precise rules possible: “this agent may reach GitHub, but only through the gh CLI” or “installs may read the registry credentials file, the agent itself may not” are statements about the chain, not about a single process. See Rules and policy for worked examples.

Policy comes from the Frontegg Portal

Rules are authored once in the Frontegg Portal and delivered to each enrolled Mac as a signed policy. The device verifies the signature before applying it, and keeps enforcing the last policy it received when offline. Policy covers what an agent may run, read and write, connect to, and which skills, extensions, and connectors it may load.

The three enforcement modes

This is the part most worth understanding, because it decides how disruptive a rollout feels. Your organization sets a default mode for the fleet, and an individual rule can override it. That override is the whole rollout strategy: keep the fleet in monitor, then promote one well-understood rule at a time to enforce. It also means “we are in monitor mode” does not guarantee nothing is ever blocked — a rule your administrator promoted still blocks. The Frontegg Portal shows which rules are enforcing.
Start in monitor. It is not a weak setting — it is how you find out what your agents genuinely need before you risk breaking someone’s workflow. See the rollout playbook.

Where it stops

AgenShield governs AI agents — not you. Your own commands, files, browsing, and applications are outside its scope, and it never collects keystrokes, screen contents, camera, microphone, or location. What it records is limited to what governed agents do, with credentials removed on the device before anything is sent. Privacy and data handling spells out exactly what leaves the Mac.

It cannot lock you out

A security product that can lock someone out of their own computer is a bigger risk than the one it was installed to manage. Three things prevent it:
  • The processes and system paths macOS needs to function can never be denied. Those limits are compiled into the signed security extension — there is no configuration file, API, or policy field that can change them.
  • Enforcement applies to AI agents. Your own account is outside the agent policy envelope.
  • If AgenShield ever starts denying an unexpected volume of ordinary system activity, it stands itself down automatically and allows everything for a cooling-off period, then re-arms itself. No one has to notice for the Mac to recover.
Changing any of that would require shipping a newly signed release. And should you ever find the host account blocked anyway, there is a local kill-switch that needs no network and no support ticket — an administrator on the Mac can disable enforcement immediately:
Enforcement stops within about a second. Once the machine is healthy again, clear it with agenshield doctor --fix.

The operating loop

1

Observe

Deploy in monitor mode. Let real work happen. The Frontegg Portal fills with what your agents actually run, read, and reach.
2

Decide

Approve what is legitimate — the package registries, the vendor APIs, the shared skills. Write rules for what is not.
3

Enforce

Promote those rules to blocking, one at a time, and watch for fallout.
4

Repeat

Agents, tools, and connectors change constantly. New activity shows up as new evidence, and the loop runs again.

Next

Quickstart

Put this into practice on one Mac.

Rollout playbook

Take it to a fleet without breaking anyone’s day.